TODO: ECH for QUIC
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| @@ -479,20 +479,6 @@ By changing the order of TLS extensions provided in the TLS handshake, it is | |
| sometimes possible to circumvent TLS fingerprinting by servers. The TLS | |
| extension order is of course not the only way to fingerprint a client. | |
| - | ## Consider OCSP stapling by default |
| - | |
| - | Treat a negative response a reason for aborting the connection. Since OCSP |
| - | stapling is presumed to get used much less in the future when Let's Encrypt |
| - | drops the OCSP support, the benefit of this might however be limited. |
| - | |
| - | [curl issue 15483](https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/15483) |
| - | |
| - | ## Provide callback for cert verification |
| - | |
| - | OpenSSL supports a callback for customized verification of the peer |
| - | certificate, but this does not seem to be exposed in the libcurl APIs. Could |
| - | it be? There is so much that could be done if it were. |
| - | |
| ## Less memory massaging with Schannel | |
| The Schannel backend does a lot of custom memory management we would rather | |
| @@ -572,6 +558,10 @@ The feature matrix at https://curl.se/libcurl/c/tls-options.html shows which | |
| features are supported by which TLS backends, and thus also where there are | |
| feature gaps. | |
| + | ## ECH for QUIC |
| + | |
| + | curl's support for ECH is currently limited to TCP only. |
| + | |
| # Proxy | |
| ## Retry SOCKS handshake on address type not supported | |